With Thanksgiving approaching, I’m reminded of that wonderful courtroom scene in Miracle on 34th Street, when an avalanche of letters to Santa Claus nearly buries the judge. Somewhere at the Surface Transportation Board, I suspect the scene looks remarkably familiar this morning. Except instead of letters to Santa, they’re getting verified statements, economic analyses, and requests for conditions. And I’m pretty sure they’re wishing they had Kris Kringle’s legal team.
The opening round of substantive comments on Union Pacific’s proposed takeover of Norfolk Southern is in. The Board now faces weeks, maybe even months, of working through submissions from railroads, shippers, labor unions, passenger advocates, local governments, and practically everyone else with a stake in the future of American railroading.
As a “Party of Record” myself, I got an average of five to six service copies an hour Wednesday and Thursday, and so far it looks as if we’re up over 130 new filings in the UPNS docket (with more to come because there are other types of filings whose deadline falls later). The docket is stuffed expert witnesses, economists, lawyers, spreadsheets, and enough footnotes to qualify as a form of literary punishment...
[Film still from Miracle on 34th Street (1947). © 1947 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation (original copyright holder). Single frame reproduced for nonprofit editorial commentary and illustrative comparison under a good-faith claim of fair use pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 107.]
Earlier this week, we told you about our own filing and why we’ve asked the Board to reject the transaction as proposed. You’ve already heard that argument from us, so today I thought it might be more entertaining to look around the room and see who else showed up.
And what a crowd!
Start with the other railroads. BNSF, CSX, and Canadian Pacific Kansas City have raised substantial objections, with some pursuing elaborate requests for access to the proposed combined network if the merger goes through. BNSF says it found more than 310 errors and corrections in the Applicants’ traffic analysis. Ooopsie! That’s an impressive number of mistakes for a transaction supposedly destined to transform the American economy. Of course, these railroads have their own commercial interests to protect, but an objection doesn’t become invalid just because the objector has something at stake.
Major agricultural and chemical shippers are unhappy, too, as are a host of other industrial customers who worry that combining two of the nation’s largest freight railroads will leave them with fewer transportation choices and less leverage over rates and service. Their basic question is pretty straightforward: if railroad consolidation is supposed to produce better service and more competition, why do so many of the people who actually buy railroad service seem less than thrilled?
Labor’s position is actually kind of fascinating. Several unions have endorsed the deal, including SMART’s Transportation Division, which negotiated employment protections with Union Pacific. Good for workers who can secure protections. But other unions, including the locomotive engineers, maintenance-of-way workers, and electrical workers, are strongly opposed. Indeed, the unions opposing the deal say they represent more than 70 percent of UP’s and NS’s unionized workforce. So the Applicants can point to the number of unions supporting them, while opponents point to the number of workers represented by opposing unions. Funny how much mileage you can get out of choosing the right denominator...
Even the trucking and intermodal industry is split. Knight-Swift, Schneider, and Hub Group see opportunities in a single-line transcontinental railroad and have supported the proposal. J.B. Hunt, meanwhile, filed a distinctly less enthusiastic assessment, warning that the deal could do more harm than good to its intermodal customers. The split is a little awkward when one of the central selling points of the merger is that it will make rail more competitive with trucks. Apparently, some of the people who move freight for a living would like a word.
The National League of Cities submitted one of my favorite letters of the entire proceeding. The League is concerned that local governments don’t have enough reliable information to evaluate how the takeover might hurt communities. Among other things, it points to discrepancies between train lengths described in the railroads’ operating plan and those reported in environmental-review materials. In one example, a train listed at 14,533 feet in the operating plan is associated with a segment whose environmental data report a maximum train length of just 7,785 feet. Another oopsie? That’s quite a disappearing act. Unfortunately, trains don’t actually shrink when somebody enters smaller numbers into a spreadsheet, and the difference matters when you’re trying to figure out how long a crossing might be blocked while an ambulance waits on the wrong side.
The League wants more information, hearings in affected states, and meaningful opportunities for local communities to participate. Its message, in essence, is that the Board shouldn’t be making decisions based on information the affected communities can’t properly evaluate. Yupper, I can definitely get behind that!
And then there’s Amtrak.
Amtrak’s submission deserves a special award for regulatory needle-threading. The company formally takes “no position” on whether the merger should be approved, but proceeds to submit 175 pages of legal argument, historical evidence, and expert analysis explaining the many ways this transaction could make life miserable for its passengers.
It’s a bit like announcing that you have absolutely no opinion about whether someone should jump off a cliff without a bungee, then providing a detailed assessment of the likely injuries, the emergency response requirements, and who ought to pay for the ambulance.
Amtrak didn’t just write a worried letter. It commissioned its own independent capacity analysis, using assumptions favorable to UP and NS, and still found serious problems. One stretch of railroad in Mississippi would operate at 117 percent of its available capacity under the proposed traffic plan. I’m no mathematician, but I’m pretty sure that’s more than all of it. Or, well, maybe it’s “oopsie” again.
Amtrak also helpfully reminded everyone that Union Pacific itself warned regulators back in 2000 about the service disruptions associated with major railroad mergers. And all of Amtrak’s long-distance trains operating over the two railroads are already below the federal minimum on-time performance standard of 80 percent. So, when UP and NS promise to maintain existing levels of passenger service, Amtrak quite reasonably wonders why perpetuating lousy performance should count as a public benefit. So do we.
Amtrak’s filing proposes nine categories of enforceable conditions, including performance standards, automatic corrective action, protection for passenger-service expansion, and seven years of continuing STB oversight. It also insists that the combined railroad pay for improvements necessitated by its own operating decisions instead of sending the bill to Amtrak, state governments, or federal taxpayers. Rather gratifyingly, Amtrak even cited several of the similar conditions we proposed in our own filing.
All of which makes its formal neutrality intriguing. Amtrak isn’t asking the Board to reject the merger, and we should take that position at face value, but it has certainly supplied the Board with a formidable collection of reasons to hit the ‘pause’ button. And yes, we strongly agree with those reasons.
That brings me to something I’ve found a little frustrating in this process. Some of our friends in the passenger and commuter rail world recognize many of the same risks we do, yet have chosen to concentrate on securing protective conditions rather than opposing the transaction outright. The Commuter Rail Coalition, for example, has proposed seven conditions intended to protect its members’ operations. Those are serious proposals, I’m glad they’re in the record, and we strongly endorse them.
But I still worry about what happens when everybody starts acting as though approval is inevitable and the only remaining question is what conditions we can negotiate. Spot the difference: telling the Board that a merger should be rejected while also specifying what protections would be necessary if it disagrees, versus treating approval as the starting assumption. The former preserves the Board’s actual responsibility. The latter risks turning a genuinely open regulatory proceeding into an exercise in negotiating who gets the window seats on the lifeboats.
I’m pleased that our longtime allies at the Environmental Law & Policy Center have joined us in opposing the transaction. And I’m equally pleased to see so much substantive attention being paid to future passenger rail expansion, publicly funded capacity, and the need for enforceable obligations that survive a merger. All those new passenger services we’ve spent years trying to develop need somewhere to run. One of them, Pennsylvania’s second daily Pennsylvanian, began operating on November 18, the very day these comments were due. That’s a particularly timely reminder that future passenger growth isn’t some wild hair dreamed up by railfans. It’s really happening. And I know that because I was on that train and was asked to speak trackside to supporters.
Now, to be fair, the merger has genuine supporters. Canadian National, major intermodal companies, some unions, and numerous other businesses believe a transcontinental single-line network will improve efficiency, reduce costs, and attract traffic from highways.
There’s also a reality that’s not directly in the filings but that Norfolk Southern points to, correctly: trucks are eating NS’s lunch. So far the U.S. government seems to have taken a policy position that this is A-OK. So A-OK that DOT thinks we should have whole fleets of driverless trucks, Waymo-style, cruising the highways that we subsidize every year with general tax revenues. NS has a genuine policy point here, and it’s one of the threats they face that’s pushing NS into UP’s arms. Regardless of how the transaction pans out, that’s an issue we probably ought to look long and hard at addressing.
All of these claims and others deserve consideration. But we can only consider what’s in the docket. The Applicants have to demonstrate -- that is, prove, document, supply hard evidence -- that the promised benefits are real, achievable, and sufficient to outweigh the potential harm. The Surface Transportation Board doesn’t exist just to count favorable and unfavorable letters and award a trophy to whoever collected the most signatures. And whatever promises get made or conditions get applied, they’re only enforceable if they’re in the docket where the public can see them and the Board can act on them.
Back in September, the Board declined to end this proceeding without a full merits review, despite significant concerns about the Applicants’ initial showing. Some observers interpreted that decision as a sign the merger was already on its way to approval. But I said then, and let me foot-stomp it now, the Board made no such determination. It chose to develop the record. Now that record is taking shape, and it’s not especially tidy.
Responses to these opening comments aren’t due until February 16. There will be further evidence, argument, rebuttal, hearings, and ultimately a decision with consequences for American freight and passenger railroading that could last for generations. So where are we? There’s substantial opposition, genuine support, a growing collection of proposed conditions, and some remarkably serious questions still awaiting convincing answers, and a lot of reading to do. Here’s what there is not: a foregone conclusion.




Certainly points out that there are serious, underlying factors that need to be addressed in national transportation policies! Is the best response a merger?!? Clearly not.
Now, can we begin the process to actually address the multitude of problems which result from poorly evolved, long-standing transportation policies.
There are no easy answers. But we must work toward a transportation system in which EACH mode of transport is allowed, and encouraged, to perform those tasks for which each mode is best suited.
Rail is the safest, most economical, “environmental” and for passengers, equitable form of transport for most corridors.
When transpiration planners pretend there is a need for more than two lanes in each direction, they have likely not engaged in careful analysis. Exceptions? Yes, but engineers trained in and focused on roadway traffic flow should not be “driving” the analysis.
As a Houstonian I am familiar with grade crossings being blocked, sometimes for hours, by long UP trains. I strongly endorse the National League of Cities’ demand for opportunities for local communities to have meaningful participation. The local press here has ignored this transaction as far as I can tell, so most people here have no idea it is happening nor the likely impacts on our communities.